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Abstract 
We study how gender differences in performance under competition are 
affected by the provision of information regarding rival’s gender and/or 
differences in relative ability. In a laboratory experiment, we use two tasks that 
differ regarding perceptions about which gender outperforms the other. We 
observe women’s underperformance only under two conditions: 1) tasks are 
perceived as favoring men and 2) rivals’ gender is explicitly mentioned. This 
result can be explained by stereotype-threat being reinforced when explicitly 
mentioning gender in tasks in which women already consider they are inferior. 
Omitting information about gender is a safe alternative to avoid women’s 
underperformance in competition. 
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1.  Introduction 
Gender differences in labor market outcomes persist, being a continuous object of study 
among economists. In addition to the classical explanations based on gender differences 
in human capital and preferences, or statistical discrimination, recently, two seminal 
papers have proposed gender differences in competitiveness as a complementary 
explanation. Gneezy et al. (2003) showed that women underperform compared to men 
in competitive environments, referred to as gender differences in performance under 
competition, while Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) showed that women are more likely 
to avoid competitive environments than men, referred to as gender differences in 
tournament entry. Since labor markets are inherently competitive, these results would 
imply a gender gap in wages either because women may be less effective in performing 
in certain competitive environments or because they may be less likely to seek 
promotions. The importance of these results has lead to abundant follow-up studies 
which have been reviewed in Croson and Gneezy (2009) and in Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2011). These surveys point out the importance of understanding which 
institutions and policies mitigate the presence of gender differences in competitiveness. 
This paper studies the effect of one potential institution, the provision of 
information to individuals before they participate in head-to-head competitions. The 
goal is to understand under which circumstances women underperform compared to 
men in competitive environments and whether this underperformance can be reduced by 
providing or omitting information. In particular we focus on two aspects of information: 
rival’s gender and ability differences between competing individuals.  
We propose a laboratory setting to test for the effect of information. In our 
experiment individuals perform two real effort tasks, first under a piece-rate incentive 
scheme and then under a competitive scheme. Although our focus is on performance in 
competitive environments, we control for inherent individual differences in ability using 
individual performance under piece-rate.  
There are four different treatments in our experiment. First, in the control 
treatment, individuals are not provided with any information before they compete. 
Second, in the “Gender Info” treatment, individuals are told the gender of their 
competing rival. Third, in the “Performance Info” treatment, individuals are provided 
with information regarding their ability with respect to their rival, measured by subjects’ 
previous performance under piece-rate incentives. Finally, in the “Gender and   3
Performance Info” treatment, we provide subjects with both pieces of information 
before subjects compete.  
Our experiment proposes two new cognitive tasks, in which perceptions 
regarding which gender outperforms the other are opposed. Previous research has 
shown that individual perceptions about whether the task favors one gender over the 
other are an important determinant in the emergence of gender differences in 
competitiveness (Günther et al., 2010, Shurchkov, 2011, Cárdenas et al., in press).  
At the end of the experiment we elicit incentivized measures of individuals’ 
confidence and their perceptions regarding each of our tasks favors one gender over the 
other. We also obtain demographics variables as well as non incentivized measures on 
individuals’ general attitudes toward competition. All these variables will be used as 
additional controls in our analysis. 
  We find that women’s relative underperformance in competitive environments 
not only depends on the task but also on the information provided (or omitted). 
Consistent with previous research, women underperform compared to men in 
competitive environments only when the task is perceived as a male task but not when it 
is perceived as a female task. That is, when competing in the task that is perceived to 
favor men women perform 20% lower than men, but show no underperformance when 
competing in the task that is perceived to favor women. More importantly we show that 
the information or its omission is crucial and that it interacts in non-trivial ways with 
perceptions about the tasks. Even when competing in the task that is perceived to favor 
men, the omission of information regarding gender can mitigate the underperformance 
of women. 
First, information regarding the rival’s gender is the determinant piece of 
information in our experiment, making women underperform compared to men. When 
no information is provided and when only information about performance differences 
between the competing individuals is provided, we do not find evidence that women 
underperform compared to men. Second, we find that information on rival’s gender 
affects women and men very differently. In the task that is perceived to favor men, it 
has a positive effect on men’s performance under competition, increasing their 
performance by almost 60%, but a negative effect on women’s performance when 
competing, reducing their performance in about 40%. On the other hand, in the task that 
is perceived to favor women the effect is positive for both men and women. Third, there 
are no differential effects depending on whether individuals are told they are competing   4
against a male or a female rival, such that the content of the information per se does not 
make a differential effect, not even when we interact rivals’ gender with subjects’ own 
gender. What is determinant is talking or (not talking) about gender but not the actual 
rivals’ gender. Fourth, when providing information about relative performance between 
the competing agents we do not observe that women underperform with respect to men 
even in the task that is perceived to favor men. Finally, when both pieces of information 
are provided, the negative effect on women’s performance in the task that is perceived 
to favor men is weaker than when only information about rival’s gender is provided, 
suggesting that the information regarding the performance differences can partially 
offset the highly negative effect of mentioning gender. 
In order to explain where our results come from, we use subjects’ individual 
characteristics, perceptions about the tasks and attitudes toward competition as 
additional controls in our analysis. While we do not find significant differences between 
men and women in standard demographics, we do find that women clearly show a 
significantly lower competitive attitude and stronger beliefs that the tasks used in the 
experiment favor men. When we add these variables as additional controls in, while 
gender differences in performance persist, they become weaker as they are partially 
explained by these variables.  
Our results are compatible with the presence of “stereotype-threat” (Steele, 
1997), defined as the concern arising from a situation where a person confirms a 
negative stereotype about their social group. Steele and Aronson (1995) and Ryan and 
Ryan (2005) argue that very subtle manipulations can activate or deactivate stereotype-
threat and affect performance. In our experiment, these manipulations are done by 
providing or omitting information regarding rival’s gender and ability differences 
between competing agents. For example, women’s performance in the task in which 
women consider themselves to have a disadvantage is negatively affected by providing 
information on rival’s gender. However, such information has no effect on the other 
task, in which there is no negative stereotype regarding women. Similarly, women’s 
negative stereotypes about themselves can be mitigated by providing information on 
ability differences between competing agents. Thus, we observe that women’s 
performance responds positively to this information in the task in which they expect to 
be worse than men but has no effect on the other task. 
Our paper thus implies the following lessons regarding the institutions that could 
mitigate women’s underperformance compared to men. First, gender should not be   5
mentioned or highlighted unless the task is perceived as a female favoring task. In other 
words, mentioning gender is highly detrimental for women when the task is perceived 
as one favoring men. Omitting information regarding rival’s gender is a safe alternative 
as it prevents women from underperforming in competitive environments.
1 Second, 
providing information about performance differences between competing individuals 
can help women, especially when this information can offset the negative effect of also 
mentioning gender in a male favoring task.  
Most previous studies have focused on policies and institutions that can change 
gender differences in tournament entry.
2 However, women underperformance in 
competitive environments deserves equal attention since it might actually explain why 
women avoid entering into competitive environments in the first place. Gneezy et al. 
(2003) manipulate the gender composition of the competing group, which is always 
visible to the subjects, and they find that women underperform in mixed gender groups 
but not in all female groups. Follow up studies also make the gender composition of the 
group visible to the participating subjects, and in some experiments subjects even 
compete face to face (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004, Antonovics et al., 2009, Dreber et 
al. 2011). The contribution of our paper is that our treatment design allows us precisely 
studying the effect or providing or omitting gender information, making it salient or 
non-salient, in order to study its effect on the stereotype threat. Gill and Prowse (2011), 
on the other hand, provide subjects with information regarding the outcome of previous 
competitions in a dynamic tournament and find that women and men respond 
differently to feedback, which is a combination of both previous performance and a 
random shock. The contribution of our paper resides on varying on whether information 
is provided or not, as well as on varying the content of the information provided, which 
includes rivals’ gender and/or ability differences, and there is no random component.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design and 
procedures, giving detailed information regarding the tasks and individuals’ perceptions 
about them. Section 3 contains the results. We first analyze the aggregate data in order 
                                                 
1 Following Lucas critique (1976), providing or omitting information might become meaningful in itself. 
If information regarding rivals’ gender is omitted only when the task is perceived as one that favors men, 
female competitors will learn information omission is bad news. Omitting this information always might 
be a safer recommendation.  
2 For example, Cason et al. (2010), Wozniak (2010), and Ertac and Szentes (2010) show that information 
on relative performance differences reduces the gender gap in tournament entry. Other papers directly 
manipulate the gender composition of the competing group, making it visible to participating subjects, 
which results in women being more likely to enter competitions among groups with a higher proportion 
of women (Sutter and Rützler, 2010, Booth and Nolen, 2009, Gupta et al., 2011, and Grosse and Riener, 
2010).   6
to see when women underperform compared to men in competitive environments. We 
then compare each informational treatment with the control, where no information is 
provided, focusing on whether women and men react differently to the informational 
treatments. Finally, we extend the analysis using individual characteristics and 
perceptions as additional controls. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains 
translations of the instructions and the post-experiment questionnaire. 
 
2.  Experimental Design and Procedures  
Sixteen experimental sessions were conducted in the Laboratori d’Economia 
Experimental (LEEX) at Universitat Pompeu Fabra using z-Tree experimental software 
(Fischbacher, 2007) in May, 2011. A total of 320 subjects, 20 per session, were 
recruited using the ORSEE recruiting system (Greiner, 2004), ensuring that subjects had 
not participated in similar experiments in our laboratory in the past.
3 Our recruiting 
method ensured that half of the subjects were men and half were women, without 
subjects noticing there was a gender aspect involved in the experiment. Upon arrival, 
subjects were called into the lab in random order and were seated in individual cubicles 
separated by screens. Subjects could observe that individuals of both genders were 
participating in the experiment but there was no special emphasis on the gender 
composition of the subject pool. 
      Each experimental session lasted one hour, including assignment of subjects to 
their seats and payment. Throughout the experiment we ensured anonymity and 
effective separation between subjects. They were paid individually and in private. All 
instructions appeared on screen and were read aloud to all subjects. Once the 
experiment had concluded, subjects filled in a voluntary questionnaire while they 
waited to be paid.  
The experiment consisted of two tasks, which subjects performed in a sequence of 
four-minute periods each, first under piece-rate incentives and then under a pair-wise 
tournament. For piece-rate incentives, one of the two tasks was selected randomly for 
payment and subjects were paid 15 euro cents for each correct solution they gave in 
such task. For the pair-wise tournaments, subjects needed to be matched. Participants 
                                                 
3 Two subjects actually repeated the experiment using different usernames but were identified and thus, 
their data from their second participation was eliminated from the analysis. Three other subjects suffered 
small computer glitches during the experiment which prevented them from having the full time to 
perform some of the tasks. Finally, two subjects submitted 0 correct responses the first time they 
undertook one of the tasks. For these subjects and tasks, data are omitted from the analysis, which 
explains the small sample size variation across treatments in the data analysis.    7
were ranked according to their performance in each of the tasks under piece-rate and 
then the top performer was matched with the second highest performer, the third with 
the fourth and so on until the participant ranked nineteenth is matched with the one 
ranked twentieth. This matching protocol was public knowledge (see instructions in the 
Appendix). Based on the tournament literature, Lazear and Rosen (1981), in order to 
study the pure effect of competition on all participants is important that the competition 
is similarly tight, which is ensured by our matching protocol. For tournament payment, 
one of the two tasks was randomly chosen and the subject who performed best in each 
pair in such task earned 30 euro cents per correct answer, while the other subject earned 
nothing.
4 Additionally, once all tasks have concluded, subjects could earn 10 euro cents 
per each of 16 questions rewarding predictive accuracy. Finally, subjects also earned a 3 
euro participation fee. Average total payments were 13.23 euro with a large standard 
deviation, 6.26, due to the competitive environment.  
The two tasks were chosen based on the extensive literature in Psychology 
regarding inherent gender differences in cognitive abilities. Our objective was to find 
two tasks in which under piece-rate incentives each gender would perform better than 
the other and, at the same time, where there existed common perceptions that one 
gender would outperform the other. Kimura (2004) argues that consistent gender 
differences in abilities are hard to find and that observed differences greatly depend on 
the specific details of the tasks. Nevertheless, there exists a degree of consensus that 
men are better than women at tasks involving spatial skills, while women outperform 
men in tasks involving certain verbal and memory skills (Kimura, 1999). In particular, 
for a male favoring task we chose a mental rotation task, see Shepard and Metzler 
(1971) for a description of the task and Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) for a review of 
gender differences in this task. For a female favoring task we chose a symbol digit 
substitution task, see Wechsler (1958) for a description of the task and see Majeres 
(1983) for evidence on gender differences in this task. A non-incentivized pilot 
experiment conducted using paper and pencil at a different university with 184 subjects 
of the same age prior to our main experiment confirmed that not only men outperformed 
women in the mental rotation task we chose and that women outperformed men at the 
                                                 
4 Since subjects did not know until the end of the experiment if, for each task, they would be paid 
according to their performance under piece-rate incentives or under the tournament, independent of their 
attitude towards risk, they always had incentives to perform the best they could.   8
symbol digit substitution task, but also that subjects on average expected these results 
when asked which gender would on average do better at each task.
5   
We adapted both the mental rotation and symbol digit substitution tasks to our 
computerized setting, which facilitated the provision of information and matching 
protocol. The mental rotation task (MRT) in our experiment consisted of showing pairs 
of three-dimensional figures to subjects who had to answer whether such figures were 
“identical” or “mirror” figures. Identical figures are those for which, after rotating one 
of them, you would get the other one. Mirror figures are those for which, no matter the 
number of rotations, one figure is never identical to the other one, and furthermore one 
is the reflection of the other figure. Figure 1 shows a pair of identical, shown in (a), and 
a pair of mirror images, shown in (b), from the experiment.  
 
(a) Identical Figures  (b) Mirror Figures 
Figure 1. Mental Rotation Task (MRT) 
 
The symbol digit substitution task (SDST) in our experiment consisted of 
showing subjects codes, which associated nine numbers to nine letters and subjects had 
to de-codify sequences of three letters into numbers. Codes were changed every nine 
three letter sequences, so that the task would involve both memory and codification 
abilities. Our SDST adapts the original symbol digit substitution task to the 
computerized setting by changing two dimensions.
6 Figure 2 shows an example of one 
of the codes used in the experiment as well as one three letter sequence and the 
corresponding correct answer. 
                                                 
5 In our non-incentivized pilot, we gave subjects two minutes to perform each task. For the mental 
rotation task men on average solved 15.56 figures correctly and women did 12.21. For symbol digit 
substitution task men on average gave 27.65 correct answers while women gave 30.48. Both differences 
are significant at the 1% level. On average, subjects assigned highest frequency to the expectation that 
men outperform women in the mental rotation task (43%), while the opposite beliefs are obtained for the 
codification task (42% of subjects expected that women outperformed men). 
6 Notice that when adapting this task to the computer we modified two elements. First, our codes 
associate numbers to letters, while in the original task codes associate numbers to symbols, and thus, 
subjects were asked to fill in numbers instead of symbols, since the z-tree software would only read 
numbers as variables. Second, sequences were presented in three letter strings instead of much longer 
strings commonly used. Shorter sequences allow us more precise performance measures.    9
 
Three letter sequence: KHR 
Correct answer: 925 
Figure 2. Code used in symbol digit substitution task (SDST) and a three letter 
sequence with its solution 
 
Our main measure of subjects’ performance is the number of correct answers 
subjects give for each of the tasks. We also use the number of submitted answers and 
the quality of submitted answers, which is calculated by the proportion of correct 
answers out of the submitted ones. Finally, to measure performance in competitive 
environments, we also look at the probability of winning each respective tournament.  
The experiment had four treatments, with 40 male and 40 female subjects in 
each treatment. In all treatments subjects perform both tasks, MRT and SDST, under a 
piece-rate scheme (called Tasks 1 and 2 in the experiment) and then they repeat both 
tasks under a tournament scheme (called Tasks 3 and 4 in the experiment). In the 
“Control” treatment subjects received no information regarding their rival’s gender or 
regarding differences in performance. In all other three treatments, subjects received 
information right after the tasks under piece-rate are over and right before starting each 
respective tournament. In the “Gender Info” treatment, subjects were told the gender of 
their rival (“Your matched participant is a boy/girl”). In the “Performance Info” 
treatment subjects were told the difference between their number of correct answers and 
those of their rival in each of the tasks under piece rate (“Your matched participant 
correctly answered X more/less figures than you did in Task 1/Task 2”). In the “Gender 
and Performance Info” treatment, subjects were given both pieces of information prior 
to each respective tournament.  
Once the four tasks concluded, subjects were given an incentivized 
questionnaire. This included questions regarding their number of correct answers, their 
relative ranking and whether women or men outperformed or not the other gender, for 
each task. For each correct answer subjects earned 10 euro cents. Additionally, in 
treatments where the information contained in such questions had not been provided in 
the past, subjects were asked questions regarding the gender of the rival and/or whether 
they believed they had outperformed or not their rival under piece-rate incentives.   10
Finally, subjects filled in a questionnaire regarding standard demographics (gender, age, 
nationality, mother language and studies), and questions regarding their attitude toward 
competition. All these variables will be used as controls when analyzing the results. See 
Figure 3 for the timeline of the experiment and see the Appendix for experimental 
instructions and for the questionnaire.  
Figure 3. Timeline of the Experiment 
 
We can now check whether our choice of tasks satisfies the inherent gender 
differences we had aimed for with our design. Notice that under piece-rate incentives, 
all four treatments are exactly the same, thus we can aggregate data in order to look for 
gender differences in each of the tasks. Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution 
function (CDF) of the number of correct answers by gender in each of the tasks. For 
MRT, the performance by males statistically dominates the one by females (two-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions yields a p-value of 
0.001). However, for SDST, we cannot reject that the two cumulative distributions are 
equal (two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions 
yields a p-value of 0.703). This result differs from the results from our pilot, in which 
we confirmed that MRT was a male favoring task while SDST was a female favoring 
task. However, when we adapted SDST to our computerized setting this is no longer the 
case (see footnote 6). Canada and Brusca (1991) find that there is a technological 
gender gap favoring men when tasks are computerized, which might explain the 
differences we find between the paper and pencil and computerized versions of this 
task. 
Task 1: 
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Figure 4. CDF of Number of Correct Answers in MRT and SDST by Gender under 
Piece-Rate 
 
More importantly, perceptions regarding which gender is favored by each task 
do not change when the tasks are adapted to a computerized setting. Figure 5 uses 
answers from the questionnaire administered after subjects concluded the experiment to 
graph the average frequency assigned by all subjects to each gender outperforming the 
other at each task under piece-rate incentives (see last question in Screen 11 of the 
instructions). Clearly, on average MRT is perceived to be a male favoring task while 





































Symbol Digit Substitution Task
 
Figure 5. Histograms of Perceptions in MRT and SDST under Piece-Rate 
 
The design of our experiment leaves us with two interesting cases. On the one 
hand, we have MRT, in which men not only outperform women but there exists a 
consensus that this is the case and, on the other, we have SDST, where perceptions 
regarding a female advantage are not confirmed by performance data. This will allow us 
in section 3.3 to further explore the role of perceptions in explaining gender differences 
in performance under competition.
7 
3.  Results 
3.1. Do Women Underperform in Competition?  
We start by exploring whether women perform worse than men in competitive 
environments. First, we consider raw data, looking at averages and distributions. 
Second, we carry out regression analysis using performance measures under piece-rate 
as controls for individual ability. For both analyses, first we use the aggregate data over 
all treatments, where we pool the control as well as the three treatment groups, and then, 
we look at each treatment separately.  
                                                 
7 Our measures of gender perceptions about the tasks are obtained once subjects have performed both 
tasks under piece-rate and tournament schemes, such that they could be interpreted as some type of ex-
post justification of their individual experiences. First, notice that subjects had monetary incentives to 
express their true perceptions. Second, perceptions were elicited before subjects were provided with their 
performance results and thus only in treatments “Performance” and “Gender and Performance” subjects 
could have a partial indication of whether they had an ex-ante advantage with respect to their rival in each 
tournament. Finally, the correlation between the number of submitted responses to each task and 
perceiving the task as favoring the opposite gender, although negative, it is always below 17%.   13
First, we look at simple averages and cumulative distribution functions (CDFs), in 
order to evaluate whether there exist gender differences in performance across tasks and 
incentive-schemes, as shown in Figure 6. We draw the improvement from performing 
under piece-rate to competitive environment, that is, the difference between the number 
of correct answers in the competitive environment and the number of correct answers 
under the piece-rate incentive scheme. Thus, the way we measure changes in 
performance under competition uses an imperfect control for individual differences in 
ability. Figure 6 shows that men improve more than women in MRT, showing clear 
gender differences when performing under competitive environments, while there is no 
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Figure 6. CDF of Improvement in the Number of Correct Answers from Piece-Rate to 
Competition Overall by Tasks 
 
Moreover, when we look at improvement by gender separated by different 
treatments, shown in Figure 7, two results are noteworthy. First, for MRT (shown in 
7(a)), the gender differences in improvement from piece-rate to competition are only 
observable in the treatments in which the rivals’ gender is provided, that is, “Gender 
Info” and “Gender and Performance Info” treatments. However, we do not observe 
gender differences in performance under competition in the “Control” and 
“Performance Info” treatments.
9 Second, for SDST (shown in 7(b)), even when we 
                                                 
8 The Mann-Whitney test for the null hypothesis that the median of the distributions is the same across 
gender rejects that the male and female improvement is the same for the MRT but cannot reject it for 
SDST with p-values of 0.0887 and 0.4963, respectively. However, two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
for equality of distribution functions cannot reject that male and female improvement is the same for both 
MRT and SDST with p-values of 0.470 and 0.948 respectively. 
9 The Mann-Whitney test for the null hypothesis that the median of the distributions is the same across 
gender rejects that the male and female improvement is the same for the treatments “Gender Info” and 
“Gender and Performance Info” but cannot reject it for the “Control” and “Performance Info” treatments 
with  p-values of 0.0048, 0.0516, 0.4650, and 0.4772, respectively. In a similar way, two-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions rejects that male and female improvement 
is the same for “Gender Info treatment” but cannot reject for the other “Control”, “Performance Info” and 
“Gender and Performance Info” treatments with p-values of 0.064, 0.976, 0.668, and 0.272, respectively.   14
disaggregate the improvement for different treatments, we do not find evidence for any 
gender difference.
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10 The Mann-Whitney test for the null hypothesis that the median of the distributions is the same across 
gender cannot reject that the male and female improvement is the same for all treatments with p-values of 
0.6399, 0.1506, 0.3027, and 0.6855, respectively. In a similar way, two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
for equality of distribution functions cannot reject that male and female improvement is the same for all 
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(b) Symbol Digit Substitution Task 
Figure 7. CDF of Improvement in the Number of Correct Answers from Piece-Rate to 
Competition by Tasks and Treatments 
 
Note that the results in Figures 6 and 7 only control for individual ability taking 
the difference between the performance in competition and the performance under 
piece-rate. Thus, we turn to regression analysis using performance under piece-rate 
incentives as control for individual ability, which we believe is the proper control. Table 
1 presents results for the aggregate data. The first four columns, (1) to (4), refer to the 
MRT and the second four columns, (5) to (8), refer to the SDST. The table includes four 
performance measures as outcome variables: probability of winning, number of 
correctly submitted answers, number of submitted answers, and finally, the quality of 
submitted answers, defined as the number of correct divided by the number of 
submitted answers. As mentioned, we control for individual ability in all regressions, 
which is measured by the corresponding performance variables in the piece-rate 
environment. For the probability of winning, the relevant control for ability is the 
difference between the subject’s number of correct answers and the rival’s number of 
correct answers when they performed each task under piece-rate. In addition to 
individual ability, when we pool the control and three treatment groups, we include   16
dummy variables for each of the treatments, where the omitted group is the control 
group.  
Table 1 
Women Performance in Competition 
                
  MENTAL ROTATION (MRT)    SYMBOL DIGIT SUBSTITUTION TASK (SDST) 
  Prob. Of Winning  Correct  Submitted  Quality    Prob. Of Winning  Correct  Submitted  Quality 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4)    (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
                           
(Correct_i-Correct_j)_PR  0.113***         0.182***      
  (0.0272)         (0.0403)      
Correct_PR   0.812***        0.764***    
   (0.0390)         (0.0295)     
Submitted_PR      0.708***       0.847***  
     (0.0353)         (0.0293)   
Quality_PR       0.759***         0.0639* 
       (0.0469)         (0.0374) 
Female  -0.389***  -2.301*** -2.251*** -2.906**   0.0712  -0.153  -0.376  0.331 
  (0.145)  (0.825)  (0.818) (1.281)    (0.145)  (0.362) (0.358) (0.318) 
Gender_Info  -0.0266 0.0885  -1.753  2.123    -0.104 1.236**  1.317***  0.148 
  (0.206)  (1.147)  (1.142) (1.802)    (0.205)  (0.512) (0.507) (0.449) 
Performance_Info  -0.0257 -0.372  -1.094  3.063*    -0.103  0.730  0.767  0.280 
  (0.204)  (1.153)  (1.148) (1.814)    (0.206)  (0.516) (0.510) (0.450) 
Gender_Performance_Info  -0.0762 0.818  -0.0647  3.075*    -0.149 0.316  0.497  -0.263 
  (0.204)  (1.150)  (1.144) (1.808)    (0.208)  (0.515) (0.509) (0.451) 
Constant  0.287*  11.38***  19.98*** 13.08***   0.167  10.95*** 8.037*** 90.69*** 
  (0.163)  (1.415)  (1.459) (4.250)    (0.165)  (1.170) (1.198) (3.628) 
                  
Observations  315  315  315 315    316  316 316 316 
R-squared     0.609  0.591  0.473       0.688  0.733  0.017 
Notes: The outcome variable in columns (1) and (5) is Prob. of Winning, which takes the value of 1 when the subject won or tied in the competition 
and 0 otherwise; in columns (2) and (6) is Correct, which measures the number of correctly solved answers under competition; in columns (3) and (7) 
is Submitted, which measures the number of submitted answers under competition; and finally in columns (4) and (8), is Quality, which is the ratio 
between Correct and Submitted. (Correct_i-Correct_j)_PR, measures the difference between the subject's correctly solved answers and her rival's 
correctly solved answers under piece rate. Correct_PR, Submitted_PR and Quality_PR measure the number of correctly submitted answers, correctly 
solved answers and the quality of answers when performing under piece-rate. Female is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the subject 
is a woman and 0 otherwise, Gender_Info is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the subject is informed about her rival's gender, 
Performance_Info is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the subject is informed about ability differences between the comepting 
subjects, and Gender_Performance_Info is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the subject is informed about both the rival's gender and 
the ability differences between competing subjects. All estimations are the result of Ordinary Least Square regressions, except for columns (1) and 
(5), which are estimated using Probit estimator. Standard errors in parentheses, where *** denotes significant at 1%, ** denotes significant at 5%, and 
* denotes significant at 10%. 
 
Table 1 shows that women clearly underperform when competing in the MRT 
but not in the SDST, such that, women’s underperformance is highly dependent on the 
task. This result is robust when looking at all four outcome variables. When competing 
in the MRT, women not only submit fewer answers but get fewer correct answers, the 
quality of their performance is significantly lower and as a consequence, they have a   17
lower probability of winning compared to men. On average, after controlling for 
individual ability differences, women get about 20% fewer correct answers than men 
under competition. However, there is no evidence that women perform worse than men 
when competing in the SDST. Also and as expected, individual ability controls are 
highly significant for all performance measures. From now on, we will focus on the 
number of correctly submitted answers, as the main outcome variable.
11  
Table 2 
Women Performance in Competition by Treatment 
                  
  MENTAL ROTATION (MRT)    SYMBOL DIGIT SUBSTITUTION TASK (SDST) 
  Control  Gender Info  Perf. Info  Gender and Perf. Info    Control  Gender Info  Perf. Info  Gender and Perf. Info 
 Correct  Correct  Correct  Correct   Correct  Correct  Correct  Correct 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                           
Correct_PR  0.899*** 0.917*** 0.746***  0.712***    0.736*** 0.694*** 0.760***  0.863*** 
  (0.0787) (0.0751) (0.0803)  (0.0752)    (0.0566) (0.0577) (0.0655)  (0.0572) 
Female  0.581 -5.403*** -0.278  -3.905***    0.351 -1.194 -0.477  0.535 
  (1.702) (1.639) (1.727)  (1.475)    (0.729) (0.717) (0.784)  (0.671) 
Constant  7.690*** 10.47*** 11.74***  15.49***    11.71*** 15.28*** 11.96***  7.121*** 
 (2.552)  (2.205)  (2.627)  (2.198)    (2.154)  (2.233)  (2.362)  (2.228) 
                  
Observations 78  80  78  79    78  80  79  79 
R-squared 0.651 0.684 0.558  0.574    0.694 0.673 0.640  0.752 
Notes: The outcome variable in all regressions is Correct, which measures the number of correctly solved answers under competition. Correct_PR 
measures the number of correctly submitted answers when performing under piece-rate. Female is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when 
the subject is a woman and 0 otherwise. All estimations are the result of Ordinary Least Square regressions. Standard errors in parentheses, where 
*** denotes significant at 1%, ** denotes significant at 5%, and * denotes significant at 10%. 
 
Table 2 reports estimation results separately for each of the four treatments. As 
before, and as columns (5) to (8) show, women do not perform worse than men, when 
competing in SDST. Interestingly, as columns (1) to (4) show, we can see that the 
underperformance of women under competition previously documented in the MRT, is 
now only significant in the two treatment groups, “Gender Info” and “Gender 
Performance Info”, in which subjects are provided with the gender of their rival before 
competing. Additionally, in the latter treatment, they are also provided with information 
regarding performance differences under piece-rate. In the other treatments, “Control” 
and “Performance Info”, women do not perform worse compared to men in competitive 
environments after we control for individual differences. This shows that women’s 
                                                 
11 When choosing the main outcome variable among the four possible variables, we discard quality 
because it is a combination of correct and submitted answers. Between correct and submitted, a principal 
will always be more interested in the number of correct than in the number of submitted answers. Finally, 
probability of winning is only relevant under competition and it also depends on the matching protocol.    18
underperformance is not only dependent on the task itself, but that it is also highly 
dependent on the information provided.  
Notice that a crucial difference between MRT and SDST is the perception about 
which gender is favoured by the task, such that, MRT is perceived as a task favouring 
men, while SDST is perceived as a task favouring women. Our results show that women 
underperform compared to men in competition only when both the task is perceived as 
favouring men and the information about gender is provided, such that the gender 
information brings subjects’ attention to their perceptions, reinforcing them. In the case 
of SDST, the former condition is not satisfied given that the task is perceived as 
favouring women. 
In the following sections we will further analyze these two results, the 
importance of the task (in relation to perceptions) and of the provided information. In 
section 3.2 we will study the effect of each piece of information, separating the effect of 
information about rival’s gender and information about ability differences, further 
exploring the importance of the content of such information. In Section 3.3 we will 
study the impact of other control variables, such as the role of perceptions.  
 
3.2. Explaining Gender Differences in Performance through Informational  
       Treatments 
In this section we compare each informational treatment with the control. The goal is to 
learn if information and in particular its content regarding rival’s gender and/or about 
ability differences between the competing subjects is affecting women and men 
differently when they perform under competition.  
In each subsection, we will be looking at informational treatment effects in four 
different steps. We start identifying the overall treatment effect. We then proceed to see 
if the overall treatment effect is significantly different for women, that is, we will look 
for differential treatment effects based on gender. Finally, we control for the content of 
the information, such that, there might be differential treatment effects based on the 
content of the information. For example, when rival’s gender is provided, knowing one 
is competing against a man or a woman might have a different effect. In a similar 
manner, when ability differences among competing subjects are provided, knowing one 
is competing with a rival who performed better or worse than oneself might have a 
different effect. Finally, we will look for differential treatment effects that depend both 
on subjects’ gender and the content of the provided information. In all regressions we 
will control for individual ability using the performance variable under piece-rate.   19
 
3.2.1.  Does Information about Rival’s Gender affect Men and Women 
Differently? 
In the gender informational treatment, “Gender Info”, after subjects have performed 
under piece-rate and right before performing under competition, they were provided 
with information about the rival’s gender, such that they were told that either they were 
competing against a man or a woman. In this section we will study if this information is 
having any impact on subjects’ performance and whether it is affecting men and women 
differently. 
Table 3 
Informing about Rival's Gender 




SYMBOL DIGIT SUBSTITUTION TASK 
(SDST) 
 Correct  Correct  Correct  Correct    Correct Correct Correct  Correct 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                    
Correct_PR  0.893*** 0.909***  0.896***  0.923***    0.722*** 0.716*** 0.723***  0.716*** 
  (0.0548) (0.0542)  (0.0568)  (0.0569)    (0.0403) (0.0403) (0.0406)  (0.0409) 
Female  -2.485** 0.641  -2.452**  -0.799    -0.399 0.359 -0.416  -0.321 
  (1.192) (1.672)  (1.210)  (2.385)    (0.510) (0.721) (0.513)  (1.015) 
Rival_Male     -0.325  -2.409       0.373  -0.357 
     (1.733)  (2.430)       (0.728)  (1.045) 
Female*Rival_Male       3.147        1.378 
       (3.352)        (1.458) 
Gender_Info  0.219 3.273**  -0.0146  2.966    1.213** 1.973*** 1.538**  1.943* 
  (1.176) (1.642)  (1.687)  (2.342)    (0.509) (0.722) (0.721)  (1.043) 
Female*Gender_Info   -6.058***   -5.781*     -1.506   -0.765 
   (2.316)    (3.323)     (1.018)   (1.441) 
Gender_Info*Rival_Male     0.467  1.046       -0.658  0.104 
     (2.398)  (3.341)       (1.027)  (1.462) 
Female*Gender_Info*Rival_Male       -0.815        -1.570 
       (4.685)        (2.050) 
Constant  9.368*** 7.409***  9.459***  8.108***    12.64*** 12.47*** 12.40***  12.64*** 
 (1.832)  (1.948)  (1.905)  (2.084)    (1.577) (1.575) (1.634)  (1.697) 
                
Observations 158  158  158  158    158 158 158  158 
R-squared 0.655  0.669  0.655  0.673    0.681 0.685 0.681  0.688 
Notes: The outcome variable in all these regressions is the correct number of submitted answers under competition. Correct_PR measures the 
number of correctly submitted answers when performing under piece-rate. Female is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the subject 
is a woman and 0 otherwise, Rival_Male is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the subject is a man and 0 otherwise, and 
Gender_Info is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the subject is informed about her rival's gender. All estimations are the result of 
Ordinary Least Square regressions. Standard errors in parentheses, where *** denotes significant at 1%, ** denotes significant at 5%, and * 
denotes significant at 10%. 
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  Table 3 reports the results. Columns (1) to (4) report the results for MRT, while 
columns (5) to (8) report the results for SDST.  
We start with the results regarding MRT. In all four regressions, the ability 
control is positive and highly significant, as expected. Column (1) provides the 
estimation results for the overall treatment effect. The treatment variable, Gender_Info, 
is not significant, that is, when rival’s gender is provided performance is not different 
from when this information is absent. However, notice that Female is negative and 
significant at 5%, showing women perform significantly worse in competition than 
men. Now, when we look for differential treatment effects that depend on gender, 
shown in column (2), we clearly see that women and men are very differently affected 
by the information about their rival’s gender. While the effect of information regarding 
rivals’ gender is positive for men, it is highly negative for women, as the variable 
Female*Gender_Info, is negative and significant at 1%. Note that the variable Female 
now becomes non-significant which suggests that the underperformance of women is 
only significant when the information about rival’s gender is provided. When no 
information is provided and controlling for their initial ability, a woman on average 
correctly solves about 8 figures while a man does 7, this difference not being 
significant. However, when information about rival’s gender is provided and controlling 
for their initial ability, a woman on average correctly solves about 5 figures while a man 
solves 11, this difference being highly significant. In other words, the information about 
rival’s gender increases men’s performance when competing by 58%, while it decreases 
women’s performance by almost 43%.   
  Columns (3) and (4) study the effect of the content of the information regarding 
rival’s gender. We define the dummy variable, Rival_Male, which takes the value of 1 
when the rival is a man and takes the value of 0 when the rival is a woman. Column (3) 
reports the estimates when we control for the content of the information. The content of 
the information per se is not having a differential effect, as it is insignificant, while 
women show to underperform in competition. Finally, in column (4) we interact the 
content of the information with subjects’ gender. The key variable in this regression is 
the triple interaction, that is, Female*Gender_Info*Rival_Male, which is insignificant, 
meaning that the content of the gender information is not affecting male and female 
subjects differently. This is important as it shows that it is the provision of information 
about rival’s gender what affects negatively to women and positively to men, but not the 
actual content of the information.    21
  We now look at SDST. Overall, the treatment variable is positive and significant 
at 5%, as shown in column (5), which suggests that when the information about rival’s 
gender is provided performance is increased. However, there is no differential treatment 
effect based on gender, as the interaction term between Female and Gender_Info, 
although negative as in MRT, is now insignificant. Moreover, as it can be observed in 
columns (7) and (8), the treatment effect is not dependent on the content of the 
information, neither there are differential treatment effects based on gender and the 
content of the information.   
  To summarize, the effect of gender information affects women and men 
differently when performing in MRT but not in SDST. In MRT women are negatively 
affected by gender information while men are positively affected, the results being very 
strong. On the other hand, in SDST, although the sign of estimated coefficients point in 
the same direction, the differential negative effect for women is not significant, 
suggesting that both women and men are positively affected by the gender information. 
 
3.2.2.  Does Information about Performance Differences affect Men and 
Women Differently?  
In the performance informational treatment, “Performance Info”, after subjects had 
performed under piece-rate and right before performing under competition, they were 
provided with information about the ability differences between the competing subjects, 
such that they were told how many more/less correct answers they gave when 
performing under piece-rate compared to their rival. In this section we study whether 
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Table 4 
Informing about Performance Differences Between the Subject and the Rival 
             
 
MENTAL ROTATION  
(MRT)   
SYMBOL DIGIT SUBSTITUTION TASK 
(SDST) 
  Correct Correct Correct Correct    Correct Correct Correct Correct 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                    
Correct_PR  0.823***  0.823*** 0.823*** 0.824***   0.746*** 0.747*** 0.745*** 0.748*** 
  (0.0562) (0.0564) (0.0571) (0.0579)    (0.0429)  (0.0429)  (0.0432)  (0.0438) 
Female  0.152 0.109 0.211 1.406   -0.0590 0.347 -0.0672 0.283 
  (1.212) (1.685) (1.215) (2.102)    (0.533)  (0.756)  (0.536)  (0.956) 
Advantage     -1.134  0.497        0.403  0.310 
     (1.712)  (2.474)        (0.793)  (1.160) 
Female*Advantage        -3.196        0.143 
        (3.407)        (1.600) 
Performance_Info  -0.376 -0.419 -1.686 -0.191    0.705 1.118 0.899 1.112 
  (1.162) (1.648) (1.474) (2.072)    (0.535) (0.765) (0.653) (0.936) 
Female*Performance_Info   0.0860  -3.009     -0.808  -0.417 
   (2.331)  (2.944)     (1.066)  (1.313) 
Performance_Info*Advantage     3.485  -0.628       -0.584  0.0571 
     (2.399)  (3.402)       (1.149)  (1.654) 
Female*Performance_Info*Advantage      8.226*        -1.291 
      (4.790)        (2.322) 
Constant  9.878***  9.900*** 10.28*** 9.667***   11.55*** 11.30*** 11.47*** 11.18*** 
  (1.911) (2.004) (1.945) (2.076)    (1.641)  (1.675)  (1.659)  (1.710) 
               
Observations  156 156 156 156   157  157  157  157 
R-squared  0.604 0.604 0.611 0.619      0.666  0.667  0.667  0.669 
Notes: The outcome variable in all these regressions is the correct number of submitted answers under competition. Correct_PR measures the 
number of correctly submitted answers when performing under piece-rate. Female is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the 
subject is a woman and 0 otherwise, Advantage is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the subject performed strictly better than 
her rival under piece-rate and 0 otherwise, and Performance_Info is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the subject is informed 
about performance differences between the competing subjects under piece-rate. All estimations are the result of Ordinary Least Square 
regressions. Standard errors in parentheses, where *** denotes significant at 1%, ** denotes significant at 5%, and * denotes significant at 
10%. 
 
  Table 4 reports the results. Columns (1) to (4) report results for MRT while 
columns (5) to (8) report results for SDST.  
We start with results regarding MRT. In all four regressions, the ability control 
is positive and highly significant, as expected. Also, in all regressions Female is 
insignificant, showing that women do not underperform compared to men in 
competition in the “Control” and “Performance Info” treatments. Column (1) provides 
the estimation results for the overall treatment effect, Performance_Info, which is 
insignificant. When ability differences between competing subjects are provided 
performance is not different from when this information is absent. Now, when we look   23
for differential treatment effects that depend on gender, shown in column (2), we see 
that women and men are not differently affected by the information about ability 
differences, either. Contrary to the information on rival’s gender, ability differences do 
not affect differently men and women.   
Columns (3) and (4) study the effect of the content of the information. The 
content can be of two types: a subject can be informed that she will be competing with a 
subject who performed worse or better under piece-rate than themselves. We define the 
dummy variable, Advantage, which takes the value of 1 when the subject has given 
strictly more correct answers than the rival when performing under piece-rate and 0 
otherwise.
12 Column (3) shows that the content of the information is not having a 
differential effect, as the interaction between Performance_Info and Advantage is not 
significant. Finally, in column (4) we interact the content of the information with the 
subjects’ gender. The key variable in this regression is the triple interaction, that is, 
Female*Performance_Info*Advantage, which is positive and significant at 10%, 
meaning that the content of the ability information affects men and women differently. 
When controlling for their ability, a woman competing with an advantage is encouraged 
by receiving this information and solves 13 figures correctly, compared to the situation 
when she does not receive this information and solves 8 figures correctly. On the other 
hand, men competing with an advantage, solve about the same number of figures 
independently of receiving this information or not, solving 9 and 10, respectively. 
However, a woman competing with a disadvantage is discouraged when receiving this 
information and solves 8 figures correctly, compared to the situation when she does not 
and solves 11 figures. On the other hand, when men compete with a disadvantage solve 
about the same number of figures independently of knowing or not about it, solving 9 
and 10 figures, respectively. This suggests that while women are encouraged 
(discouraged) by positive (negative) information regarding ability when competing, 
men are immune to it.  
  When we look at SDST, in columns (5) and (8) we do not find any significant 
results regarding the overall treatment effect, content of the information or any 
interaction with gender.  
                                                 
12 Note that the correlation between the number of correct answers under piece-rate, Correct_PR, and 
whether subjects had an advantage over their rivals, Advantage, is not expected to be high given the 
matching protocol explained in the experimental design, as top performers and bottom performers will 
have a similar probability to be competing with an advantage. The actual correlations between these two 
variables confirm this intuition, which are of 13% and of 7% for the MRT and SDST, respectively.    24
To summarize, the effect of gender information on performance under 
competition is not replicated when looking at information about ability differences 
Women do not underperform competing in MRT or in SDST when comparing 
“Performance Info” with the “Control” treatment. Moreover, we find differential 
treatment effects based on gender only when we control for the content of the 
information in the MRT. In particular, positive (negative) information about ability 
differences encourages (discourages) women but not men, who are immune to this 
information. However, when competing in SDST, information about ability differences 
between competing subjects is affecting neither men nor women.  
 
3.2.3.  Does Combined Information about Performance Differences and Rival’s 
Gender affect Men and Women Differently?  
In the gender and performance informational treatment, “Gender Performance Info”, 
after subjects have performed under piece-rate and right before performing under 
competition, they were provided with information about both the rival’s gender and the 
performance differences between the competing subjects. Subjects were told that either 
they were competing with a man or a woman and also how many more/less correct 
answers they gave when performing under piece-rate compared to their rival. In this 
section we study whether this information has an impact on subjects’ performance and 
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Table 5 
Informing about Rival's gender and Performance Differences Between the Subject and the Rival 
                 
 
MENTAL ROTATION  
(MRT)   
SYMBOL DIGIT SUBSTITUTION TASK 
(SDST) 
 Correct  Correct  Correct  Correct    Correct Correct  Correct  Correct 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
               
Correct_PR  0.801*** 0.810*** 0.811*** 0.837***    0.794***  0.794***  0.801*** 0.798*** 
  (0.0549) (0.0548)  (0.0588)  (0.0621)  (0.0403) (0.0404)  (0.0413)  (0.0423) 
Female  -1.892* 0.0336  -1.867  0.800  0.453  0.329  0.390  -0.827 
  (1.132) (1.602)  (1.160)  (2.832)    (0.496) (0.706)  (0.500)  (1.240) 
Adv_Rival_Male     -0.707  -0.884       0.710  0.143 
     (2.232)  (3.074)       (1.034)  (1.458) 
Adv_Rival_Female     -0.924  1.325       0.207  -0.516 
     (2.489)  (3.653)       (1.049)  (1.571) 
Disadvantage_Rival_Male     0.378  -1.337        0.304  -0.735 
     (2.105)  (3.025)       (0.886)  (1.271) 
Female*Adv_Rival_Male       -0.758         1.229 
       (4.403)         (2.091) 
Female*Adv_Rival_Female       -5.039         1.518 
       (5.005)         (2.122) 
Female*Disadv_Rival_Male       1.632         2.107 
       (4.179)         (1.789) 
Gender_Perf_Info  0.803 2.700*  2.514  4.892*    0.282 0.157  0.351  -0.745 
  (1.112) (1.576)  (2.050)  (2.708)    (0.498) (0.711)  (0.855)  (1.174) 
Female*Gender_Perf_Info   -3.749*    -5.902     0.247    2.380 
   (2.220)    (4.132)     (0.994)    (1.721) 
Adv_Rival_Male*Gender_Perf_Info     -3.719  -3.341       -0.494  0.747 
     (3.321)  (4.536)       (1.472)  (2.110) 
Adv_Rival_Female*Gender_Perf_Info     -0.280  -2.477       -1.514  0.841 
     (3.361)  (5.028)       (1.521)  (2.173) 
Disadv_Rival_Male*Gender_Perf_Info     -3.105  -3.119       0.653  2.171 
     (2.918)  (4.144)       (1.223)  (1.762) 
Female*Adv_Rival_Male*Gender_Perf_Info          -0.360         -2.635 
       (6.850)         (2.979) 
Female*Adv_Rival_Female*Gender_Perf_Info       5.744         -5.073 
       (6.863)         (3.085) 
Female*Disadv_Rival_Male*Gender_Perf_Info       2.200         -3.163 
       (5.788)         (2.473) 
Constant  11.47*** 10.25*** 11.38*** 9.835***    9.516***  9.583***  9.033*** 9.686*** 
 (1.806)  (1.934)  (1.941)  (2.193)    (1.547)  (1.575)  (1.611)  (1.712) 
               
Observations 157  157  157  157    157  157  157  157 
R-squared 0.605  0.612  0.616  0.632      0.722  0.722  0.731  0.738   26
Notes: The outcome variable in all these regressions is the correct number of submitted answers under competition. Correct_PR measures the number of 
correctly submitted answers when performing under piece-rate. Female is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the subject is a woman and 0 
otherwise, Adv_Rival_Male is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the subject performed strictly better than her rival under piece-rate and the 
rival is a male subject, and 0 otherwise; Adv_Rival_Female is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the subject performed strictly better than her 
rival under piece-rate and the rival is a female subject, and 0 otherwise; Disadv_Rival_Male is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the subject 
performed worse than her rival under piece-rate and the rival is a male subject, and 0 otherwise. Gender_Perf_Info is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 when the subject is informed about both about rival's gender and performance differences between the competing subjects under piece-rate. All 
estimations are the result of Ordinary Least Square regressions. Standard errors in parentheses, where *** denotes significant at 1%, ** denotes significant at 
5%, and * denotes significant at 10%. 
 
Table 5 reports the results. Columns (1) to (4) report results for MRT while 
columns (5) to (8) report results for SDST.  
We start with results regarding MRT. In all four regressions, the ability control 
is positive and highly significant, as expected. Column (1) provides the estimation 
results for the overall treatment effect, Gender_Perf_Info, which is insignificant. When 
we look for differential treatment effects that depend on gender, shown in column (2), 
we see that women and men are differently affected by the information about rival’s 
gender and performance differences, although this is only significant at the 10% level. 
This is consistent with what we found when looking at rival’s gender information in 
isolation (section 3.2.2). Men are positively affected by the gender and performance 
information while women are negatively affected by this information.  
Columns (3) and (4) study the effect of the content of the information. Notice that 
the content of the information in this treatment can be of four types: a subject can be 
informed that she will be competing with a man who performed worse, with a man who 
performed better, a woman who performed worse and finally with a woman who 
performed better than themselves. We define three dummy variables, Adv_Rival_Male, 
which takes the value of 1 when the subject has given strictly more correct answers than 
his/her male rival when performing under piece-rate, and 0 otherwise;   
Adv_Rival_Female, which takes the value of 1 when the subject has given strictly more 
correct answers than his/her female rival when performing under piece-rate and 0 
otherwise; and Disadv_Rival_Male, which takes the value of 1 when the subject has 
given strictly fewer correct answers than his/her male rival when performing under 
piece-rate and 0 otherwise. Column (3) shows that the content of the information per se 
is not having a differential effect, as the interaction between Gender_Perf_Info and the 
three dummy variables are not significant. Finally, in column (4) we interact the content 
of the information with the subjects’ gender. The key variables in this regression are the 
three triple interactions but neither is significant. Notice that the lack of significance 
when looking at the effect of the content of the information might be due to the sample 
size being dramatically reduced.     27
  When we look at SDST, in columns (5) and (8) we do not find any significant 
results regarding the overall treatment effect, content of the information or any 
interaction with gender.  
To summarize, the combined effect of gender and performance information on 
performance under competition is consistent with what we found when we looked at the 
gender information alone. When women compete in MRT, information on rivals’ 
gender affects men positively but affects women negatively. When competing in SDST, 
this information has no effect. There seems to be an interaction between gender and 
performance information, such that, the combined information on both performance and 
gender is weakening the strong effects that we found when only information about 
rival’s gender is provided. When given combined information, one piece of information 
can reinforce or weaken the other. For example, a female subject when learning the 
gender of the rival, which would decrease her performance, can also learn that she is 
competing with an advantage over her rival, which would increase her performance.  
 
3.3.  Explaining Differences in Performance with Other Controls: How do 
Women Differ from Men?  
We have shown that when information regarding rival’s gender and when combined 
information about rival’s gender and performance differences is provided women 
underperform under competition in MRT but not in SDST. Given we obtained data on 
individual characteristics during and after the experiment, we can further explore 
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Table 6 
Control Variables Separated by Male and Female Subjects 
                     
  All Subjects    Male Subjects    Female Subjects   
Variables Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.    Obs Mean Std. Dev.    Obs Mean  Std. Dev.  P-Value 
Demographics:                   
Age  318  21.49  3.20   158  21.62  3.68   160 21.36  2.64 0.88 
Foreign  318  0.07  0.25   158  0.06  0.24   160 0.07  0.25 0.84 
Fields of Study:                      
Social_Sciences  318  0.62  0.49   158  0.66  0.48   160 0.58  0.49 0.16 
Humanities  318  0.25  0.44   158  0.23  0.42   160 0.28  0.45 0.40 
Applied_Sciences  318  0.04  0.21   158  0.06  0.24   160 0.03  0.16 0.10 
Natural_Sciences  318  0.04  0.20   158  0.01  0.08   160 0.08  0.26 0.00 
Other_Fields  318  0.04  0.20   158  0.04  0.19   160 0.04  0.21 0.80 
Attitudes toward Competition:                
Experience_Competing  318  0.31  0.46   158  0.49  0.50   160 0.13  0.33 0.00 
Ability_Competing  318  4.81  1.33   158  5.14  1.30   160 4.49  1.28 0.00 
Enjoy_Competing  318  4.70  1.64   158  5.11  1.60   160 4.29  1.58 0.00 
Gender Perception about Tasks:                
MRT: Favors_Opposite_Gender  318  0.38  0.49   158  0.22  0.42   160 0.54  0.50 0.00 
SDST: Favors_Opposite_Gender  318  0.32  0.47   158  0.40  0.49   160 0.25  0.43 0.00 
Confidence:                      
MRT: Guessed_Rank   317  9.57  4.52   158  8.33  4.34   159 10.81  4.37 0.00 
SDST: Guessed_Rank   317  10.07  4.03   157  9.33  4.21   160 10.79  3.72 0.00 
MRT: Confidence_Rank  317  0.88  5.37   158  1.06  5.26   159 0.69  5.50 0.49 
SDST: Confidence_Rank  317  0.42  5.74   157  1.12  5.84   160 -0.28  5.58 0.04 
Notes: Foreign is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the subject is non-Spanish. There are five fields of studies. Each of 
them measures the proportion of subjects studying each of the fields.  Experience_Competing is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the subject revealed she has actively participated in comeptitive activities. Ability_Competing and Enjoy_Competing 
measure the degree of agreement in a scale between 1 (total disagreement) and 7 Itotal agreement) to subjects reveal to the following 
statement: “I am good at/enjoy competing”. Favors_Opposite_Gender is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the subject 
is male/female and reveals that he thinks the task favors females/males and 0 otherwise.  Guessed_Rank is a variable that measures 
subjects' guesses about their rank (between 1 representing the best among 20 subjects and 20 representing the worst among 20 
subjects) when performing under piece-rate. Confidence_Rank is represents the difference between the actual rank and the guessed 
rank when performing under peice-rate.  The final column represents the p-value for the Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank 
test with ties. 
 
  We start by looking at whether there exist differences between men and women 
in the control variables we obtained in the experiment. Table 6 summarizes the 
individual characteristics grouped in four categories for all subjects, as well as, 
separated by gender. The last column includes the p-values for the Kruskal-Wallis 
equality-of-populations rank test. The variables in the first category, demographics, 
were elicited in the ex-post questionnaire. They include subjects’ age, whether they are 
foreign or not, and their field of study, classified in five categories.
13 We do not observe 
                                                 
13 Social Sciences include fields such as Economics and Business, Humanities include fields such as Law, 
Applied Sciences include fields such as Engineering, and finally Natural Sciences include fields such as 
Biology.    29
significant differences between female and male subjects, except for the proportion of 
subjects studying Natural Sciences, which has a very low frequency in the sample. The 
second category, attitudes toward competition, also elicited in the ex-post questionnaire, 
includes a dummy variable indicating whether subjects regularly participate in 
competitive activities (Experience_Competing), and two variables ranging from 1 to 7 
(where 1 indicates subjects’ total disagreement and 7 indicates total agreement) 
regarding whether subjects consider they are good at competing and whether they enjoy 
competing. In all three variables male subjects clearly show a significantly more 
competitive attitude. The variables in the third category, gender perception about tasks, 
were elicited with monetary incentives right after subjects concluded the tasks but 
before they could observe any result. In particular, we define Favors_Opposite_Gender 
as the proportion of subjects of each gender who thinks each task favors the opposite 
gender. Two observations are worth noting. First, on average both genders perceive 
MRT as a male favoring task while SDST is perceived as a female favoring task, which 
can be clearly observed in Figure 8. Second, a higher proportion of female subjects 
think MRT is a male favoring task (54%) than the proportion of male subjects thinking 
SDST is a female favoring task (40%). The final category, confidence, includes two 
types of variables. Guessed_Rank is defined as subjects’ incentivized beliefs about their 
rank in each of the tasks, elicited after they concluded all tasks but before they observed 
any result. Confidence_Rank, used as a control variable, is defined as the difference 
between subjects’ actual rank in each of the tasks under piece-rate and Guessed_Rank. 
In both tasks women expect to be ranked significantly lower than men.  Given women 
underperform with respect to men in MRT but not in SDST, our confidence measure 
shows significant gender differences for SDST but not for MRT. Men are always 
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Symbol Digit Substitution Task
 
Figure 8. Histograms of Perceptions in MRT and SDST under Piece-Rate by Gender 
 
  In order to further explore gender differences under competition, we include all 
the presented variables as controls in our main regressions in Tables 1 and 2. Columns 
(1) and (6) of Table 7 replicate the regressions presented in columns (2) and (5) in Table 
1 adding the additional controls. Columns (2) to (5) and columns (7) to (10) replicate 
the regressions in columns (1) to (4) and columns (5) to (8) in Table 2 adding the 
additional controls.  
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Table 7 
Women Performance in Competition with Control Variables 
                    
  MENTAL ROTATION (MRT)    SYMBOL DIGIT SUBSTITUTION TASK (SDST) 
  All  Control  Gender Info  Perf Info 
Gender and  
Perf Info    All  Control  Gender Info  Perf Info 
Gender and  
Perf Info 
 Correct  Correct  Correct  Correct  Correct   Correct  Correct  Correct  Correct  Correct 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)    (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
                      
Correct_PR  0.844***  0.859*** 0.904*** 0.970*** 0.712***   0.788***  0.734*** 0.723*** 0.790*** 0.909*** 
  (0.0504) (0.110)  (0.111)  (0.0976)  (0.107)   (0.0415) (0.0976)  (0.0798)  (0.0921)  (0.0841) 
Female  -0.922 0.293  -2.968*  2.566  -4.488**    -0.193 0.666  -1.060  -0.190  -0.191 
 (0.919)  (2.191)  (1.770)  (1.713)  (2.000)    (0.411)  (0.943)  (0.777)  (0.915)  (0.851) 
Gender_Info  0.753           1.401***         
  (1.132)           (0.518)        
Perf_Info  0.517           0.751        
  (1.124)           (0.517)        
Gender_Perf_Info  1.837           0.287        
 (1.128)            (0.520)         
Age  0.104 0.174  0.0419  0.235  0.115    0.00111  -0.00302 -0.190  0.0666  -0.0651 
  (0.131) (0.253)  (0.406)  (0.389)  (0.214)    (0.0600) (0.111)  (0.177)  (0.230)  (0.0943) 
Foreign  0.144 -2.189  -0.302  1.978  2.450    -2.140***  -0.908  -2.152*  -2.179  -0.284 
 (1.662)  (4.424)  (2.677)  (4.234)  (3.757)    (0.774)  (1.990)  (1.175)  (2.305)  (1.644) 
Social_Sciences  -3.007 -2.813  -3.515  -1.329  -1.002   0.339  0.583  0.665  1.146  -1.868 
 (2.013)  (4.222)  (4.139)  (3.327)  (5.195)    (0.923)  (1.850)  (1.839)  (1.869)  (2.222) 
Humanities  -0.994 -1.290  -1.180  1.222  -1.504   0.800  1.325  1.861  1.620  -2.265 
 (2.074)  (4.177)  (4.284)  (3.549)  (5.236)    (0.949)  (1.844)  (1.878)  (1.970)  (2.258) 
Applied_Sciences  -1.895 3.637  -6.062  -1.925      1.115  2.420  -0.211  1.972   
 (2.749)  (5.536)  (6.959)  (4.165)      (1.268)  (2.452)  (2.932)  (2.384)   
Natural_Sciences  1.765 1.003  0.285  4.778  4.588    -1.458 0.831  0.888  -2.992  -4.953 
  (2.811) (5.319)  (8.264)  (4.737)  (7.245)   (1.264) (2.232)  (3.670)  (2.670)  (2.998) 
Experience_Comp  0.530 -1.129  0.521  2.188  0.366    -0.705 -0.488  0.624  -1.380 -2.677*** 
 (0.960)  (2.459)  (1.798)  (1.770)  (2.140)    (0.444)  (1.068)  (0.787)  (1.003)  (0.913) 
Ability_Competing  1.234*** 0.957  2.988***  0.560  0.467    0.234  0.364  0.925**  0.258  0.0104 
 (0.420)  (0.907)  (0.990)  (0.845)  (0.789)    (0.193)  (0.400)  (0.447)  (0.478)  (0.352) 
Enjoy_Competing  -0.0761 -0.847  -0.679  1.025*  0.0600    -0.0762  0.300  -0.844**  0.0165  0.166 
  (0.336) (0.705)  (0.793)  (0.574)  (0.731)   (0.155) (0.328)  (0.354)  (0.327)  (0.321) 
Favors_Opposite_Gender  -1.959** -2.737  -3.182*  -4.007**  1.955   -0.641  -1.249  -0.338  0.101  0.226 
  (0.894) (2.242)  (1.841)  (1.885)  (1.748)   (0.397) (0.890)  (0.773)  (0.989)  (0.821) 
Confidence_Ranks  0.218** -0.00513  0.174  0.697***  -0.0319    0.0493  0.131  0.0735  0.0501  0.0177 
  (0.0977) (0.221)  (0.205)  (0.192)  (0.186)   (0.0435) (0.105)  (0.0855)  (0.0986)  (0.0777) 
Constant  3.925  7.119  0.988  -6.968  10.70   9.382***  8.162 16.88*** 7.474  8.921* 
 (4.240)  (8.790)  (9.828)  (9.685)  (8.629)    (2.327)  (4.988)  (5.042)  (6.513)  (4.539) 
                      
Observations 315  78  80  78  79    316  78  80  79  79 
R-squared 0.655  0.692  0.772  0.735  0.600    0.709  0.739  0.753  0.686  0.790   32
Notes: The outcome variable in all these regressions is the correct number of submitted answers under competition. Correct_PR measures the number of correctly 
submitted answers. Female is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the subject is a woman and 0 otherwise, Gender_Info is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 when the subject is informed about her rival's gender, Perf_Info is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the subject is informed about ability 
differences between the competing subjects, and Gender_Perf_Info is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the subject is informed about both the rival's 
gender and the ability differences between competing subjects under piece-rate. The rest of the variables are control variables that have been defined in the notes of Table 
7. All estimations are the result of Ordinary Least Square regressions. Standard errors in parentheses, where *** denotes significant at 1%, ** denotes significant at 5%, 
and * denotes significant at 10%. 
 
We start commenting on the results regarding MRT. In column (1) of Table 7, 
the dummy variable for female subjects is no longer significant while in Table 1 this 
variable was negative and significant at 1%. This indicates that when adding controls 
women do not underperform in competition compared to men. Three control variables 
show significant effects and explain the lack of significance of the female dummy. 
Subjects who believe they are good at competing (Ability_Competing) as well as those 
who are overconfident (Confidence_Rank) perform better, which is shown by the 
positive and significant coefficients. We have seen in Table 6 that overall women think 
they are worse at competing than men, and that they are less overconfident than men, 
such that these two variables are in part explaining the underperformance of women 
compared to men when competing. More importantly, subjects who think that the MRT 
favors the opposite gender perform significantly worse, which is shown by the negative 
and significant coefficient of Favors_Opposite_Gender. In Table 6, we also observed 
that higher proportion of women than men thinks that they are facing a task that favors 
the opposite gender, which again partly explains the underperformance of women 
compared to men.   
In columns (2) to (5) of Table 7 we show the regressions with additional controls 
separated by treatment. As in Table 2, the female dummy is significant in those 
treatments in which information about rivals’ gender has been provided, that is, 
treatments “Gender Info” and “Gender Ability Info”, shown in columns (3) and (5) in 
Table 7. Compared to the regressions without controls, shown in columns (2) and (4) in 
Table 2, the female dummy shows lower significance, as shown in columns (3) and (5) 
of Table 7, which is explained by the inclusion of the control variables. This indicates 
that the information regarding rivals’ gender is crucial to explain women’s 
underperformance in competition, while also provides an explanation to why the female 
dummy became insignificant when pooling all the treatments, shown in column (1) of 
Table 7. Interestingly, when the combined information about rival’s gender and 
performance differences is provided, the three control variables are no longer 
significant, which shows that the provision of performance differences is interacting 
with the gender information, overruling the beliefs on the ability to compete, confidence 
and perceptions about the task.    33
Regarding SDST, column (6) in Table 8 shows that women still do not 
underperform in competition when adding further controls, consistent with the results in 
Table 1. The three control variables we mentioned above, although they have the same 
sign as in the regressions for MRT, are not significant. Columns (7) to (10) replicate the 
regressions for each treatment, as in Table 2, but they now include the control variables. 
Consistent with the results in Table 2, when we add controls, the female dummy is still 
not significant. This shows that the underperformance of women is highly dependent on 
the task. 
      
4.  Discussion 
We find that information regarding rival’s gender and/or relative abilities is 
determinant to understand gender differences in performance under competition. In 
particular, information regarding rival’s gender decreases women’s performance in 
tasks in which they consider their gender already has a disadvantage. Additionally, 
when women are provided with information regarding ability differences, this 
information can mitigate the negative impact of learning rival’s gender.  
Our results are compatible with the provision (omission) of information 
reinforcing (attenuating) the presence of stereotype threat, which influences women 
performance in a great manner. Therefore, manipulations such as omitting or providing 
information can reinforce or weaken previous perceptions about the task as well as 
perceptions of competitive abilities and therefore affect performance. For example, 
policies should aim at correcting false preconceptions about women’s relative lower 
ability at jobs traditionally considered as male, when such perceptions are in fact not 
true. Similarly, an important policy implication in light of our results is that affirmative 
action policies based on gender may in fact have counterproductive effects, since while 
creating advantageous conditions for women they also make gender information salient, 
affecting women’s performance negatively. Further research about how to design 
competitive institutions such that women’s performance is not affected by stereotype 
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Below you can find a translation of the experimental instructions (originally in Spanish) 
which appeared sequentially on computer screens and were read aloud by the same 
experimentalist in all sessions. Variations for each treatment are indicated in parenthesis. 
     




THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN OUR EXPERIMENT! 
     
This is an experiment and thus, no talking, looking-around or walking is allowed. If you have any 
question or need help please raise your hand and one of the researchers will assist you. If you do not 
follow the indicated rules, WE WILL ASK YOU TO LEAVE THE EXPERIMENT AND YOU 
WILL NOT RECEIVE ANY PAYMENT. Thank you. 
 
Both Pompeu Fabra and Autònoma de Barcelona universities have provided funds used in this 
experiment. You will receive 3 euros for having arrived on time. Additionally, if you follow the 
instructions correctly you may earn more money. 
 
Each participant has an "Experiment Code" determined by the number which appears on each 
computer terminal. As you could observe when you arrived, your number has been assigned 
randomly. Participants will not be able to identify each other by their decisions nor their earnings. 
Researchers will observe each participant’s earnings at the end of the experiment but we will not 
associate your decisions with any participants’ names.  
 
The experiment consists of 4 tasks. Before each task, we will inform you about the type of decisions 
you will have to take and about how your decisions will affect your earnings. Everything you earn 
will be paid in cash and in a strictly private manner at the end of the experimental session. 
 
Your final earnings will be the sum of the 3 euros you receive for participating plus whatever you 
earn in 2 of the 4 tasks of the experiment. The computer will randomly determine if you will be paid 
for task 1 or task 2 of the experiment. Similarly, the computer will randomly determine whether you 
will be paid for task 3 or task 4 of the experiment. 
 




Let us see two examples: 
 
-  If the computer determines that you will be paid for tasks 1 and 4 of the experiment, your 
earnings will be: 3 euros for your participation + your earnings in task 1 + your earnings in task 
4. 
-  If, for example, the computer determines that you will be paid for tasks 2 and 4 of the 
experiment, your earnings will be: 3 euros for your participation + your earnings in task 2 + your 
earnings in task 4.   37
 
At the end of the experiment, the program will inform you about your results in each of the tasks, 
which tasks have been randomly chosen for realizing the payments and what your final earnings are.  
 




Task 1 Instructions 
 
In task 1 of the experiment, you will see two geometric figures, one next to each other. These figures 
can either be “identical” or “mirror”. Your task consists of indicating, for each pair of figures, which 
is the case. 
 
1.  Identical: The two geometric figures are the same, although one of them may be rotated a certain 
number of degrees with respect to an axis. I.e., if we rotated one of the figures we would get the 
other one. 
Example 1: Identical figures: 
 
 
2.  Mirror: The two geometric figures are different and, in fact, if we rotated one of them we would 
obtain a reflection of the other. I.e., if we rotated one of the figures we would never get two 
identical figures, because one would be the reflection of the other. 
Example 2: Mirror figures: 
 
 SCREEN  4 
 
The computer will show you, for the next 4 minutes, pairs of figures and your task will consist of 
identifying whether such pairs are identical or mirror figures. All participants in the experiment 
will see the same pairs of figures in exactly the same order. If at the end of the experiment the 
computer randomly chooses task 1, you will earn 15 euro cents for each correct answer. 
 




Task 2 Instructions 
 
In task 2 you will be given some codes. Each code shows which letter of the alphabet 
corresponds to a number from 1 to 9. Your task consists of decoding sequences of letters, i.e., in 
associating numbers to letters following the given code. 
 
For example, if the code is: 
   38
And the sequence of letters we give you is: TWK 
The correct answer would be: 469 
 
During the next 4 minutes, the computer will show codes and sequences of letters in order for 
you to write the corresponding numbers. All participants in the experiment will see the exact 
same sequences of letters and exactly in the same order. If at the end of the experiment the 
computer randomly chooses task 2, you will earn 15 euro cents for each correct sequence of 
letters. 
 




Task 3 Instructions 
In task 3, you will have to do the same as in task 1; i.e., the computer will show you for the next 
4 minutes pairs of figures and your task consists of identifying whether they are identical or 
mirror figures. 
 
All participants in the experiment will see the same pair of figures in exactly the same order. 
 
In this task you are matched with another participant in the experiment. Matching has been 
determined by the number of correct answers in task 1 of the experiment. The computer will 
order participants from larger to smaller number of correct answers in task 1. 
 
       T a s k   1  









20 Participant with the lowest number of correctly identified figures  
 
Using this order, the computer will match participants in the following manner. The first with the 
second, the third with the fourth, the fifth with the sixth and similarly until the ninetieth 
participant is matched with the twentieth participant in the ranking. You will not know your 
position in the ranking, i.e., you will not know whether you are the 1
st, 2
nd … or 20
th but, using 
this matching mechanism, it is guaranteed that the participant matched with you gave a similar 
number of correct answers in task 1 as you did. 
 
When task 3 is finished, the computer will compare your number of correct answers in task 3 
with the number of correct answers in task 3 of your matched participant, and earnings will 
depend on this comparison. 
 
o  If at the end of the experiment the computer determines you will be paid for task 3, you 
will earn double what you earned in task 1 for each correct answer; i.e., 30 euro cents 
per correct answer, whenever your number of correct answers is larger than the number 
of correct answers of your matched participant. 
o  You will earn nothing if your number of correct answers is lower than the number of 
correct answers of your matched participant. 
o  In the case of ties, each participant will earn 15 euro cents per correct answer. 
 
Press OK in order to start with task 3 of the experiment. 
 
(In treatments “Gender Info”, before showing pairs of figures the following messaged appeared: 
“Your matched participant is a boy/girl”. In treatment “Performance Info”, before showing pairs 
of figures the following message appeared on screen: “Your matched participant correctly 
answered X more/less figures than you did in task 1”. In treatment “Gender and Performance 




Task 4 Instructions 
 
In task 4, you will have to do the same as in task 2; i.e., the computer will show you for the next 
4 minutes different codes and sequences of letters and your task consists of decoding sequences 
of letters; i.e., in associating numbers to letters following the given code. 
 
All participants in the experiment will see the same codes and sequences of letters in exactly the 
same order. 
 
In this task you are matched with another participant in the experiment. Matching has been 
determined by the number of correct answers in task 2 of the experiment. The computer will 
order participants from larger to smaller number of correct answers in task 2. 
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20 Participant with the lowest number of correctly decoded sequences 
 
Using this order, the computer will match participants in the following manner. The first with the 
second, the third with the fourth, the fifth with the sixth and similarly until the ninetieth 
participant is matched with the twentieth participant in the ranking. You will not know your 
position in the ranking, i.e., you will not know whether you are the 1
st, 2
nd … or 20
th but, using 
this matching mechanism, it is guaranteed that the participant matched with you gave a similar 
number of correct answers in task 2 as you did. 
 
When task 4 is finished, the computer will compare your number of correct answers in task 4 
with the number of correct answers in task 4 of your matched participant, and earnings will 
depend on this comparison. 
 
o  If at the end of the experiment the computer determines you will be paid for task 4, you 
will earn double what you earned in task 2 for each correct answer; i.e., 30 euro cents 
per correct answer, whenever your number of correct answers is larger than the number 
of correct answers of your matched participant. 
o  You will earn nothing if your number of correct answers is lower than the number of 
correct answers of your matched participant. 
o  In the case of ties, each participant will earn 15 euro cents per correct answer. 
 
Press OK in order to start with task 4 of the experiment. 
 
(In treatments “Gender Info”, before showing pairs of figures the following messaged appeared: 
“Your matched participant is a boy/girl”. In treatment “Performance Info”, before showing pairs 
of figures the following message appeared on screen: “Your matched participant correctly 
associated X more/less sequences than you did in task 2”. In treatment “Gender and Performance 
Info” both messages appeared on screen). 
 
 
SCREENS 8 TO 11 
 
(The following three questions were asked to all participants in all treatments for each of the four 
tasks once the four tasks had concluded but before showing any result to them. Subjects were paid 10 
extra euro cents per correct answer.) 
   40
•  How many figures (sequences of letters) do you think you have correctly identified 
(decoded) in task 1 (2, 3, 4)? 
•  Out of the 20 participants in the experimental session, what do you think is your ranking 
when ordering results in task 1 (2, 3, 4) of the experiment? 
•  Out of all participants in the experimental session, who do you think performed task 1(2, 3, 




(The following four questions were asked to subjects in treatments where the information contained 
in such questions had not been provided in the past. Subjects were paid 10 extra euro cents per 
correct answer.) 
•  Who do you think has correctly identified more figures in task 1? Me/ My matched 
participant in task 3. 
•  Do you think you have competed against a boy or a girl in task 3? 
•  Who do you think has correctly decoded more sequences of letters in task 2? Me / My 
matched participant in task 4. 











- Do you take part in any type of competitive activity (cultural, Sports, Entertainment), i.e., in which you 
compete? 
 
- If so, in which one?  
 
- “I am good at competing”, please indicate your degree of agreement with this sentence, using a 1 to 7 
scale. 1 means you completely disagree, while 7 means you completely agree. 
 
- “I enjoy competing”, please indicate your degree of agreement with this sentence, using a 1 to 7 scale. 1 
means you completely disagree, while 7 means you completely agree. 